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Abstract
Purpose: Cloud computing systems represent one of the most complex computing
systems currently in existence. Current applications of Cloud involve extensive use of
distributed systems with varying degree of connectivity and usage. With a recent focus
on large-scale proliferation of Cloud computing, identity management in Cloud based
systems is a critical issue for the sustainability of any Cloud-based service. This area has
also received considerable attention from the research community as well as the IT
industry. Numerous Cloud Identity Management Systems (IDMSs) have been proposed
so far; however, most of those systems are neither widely accepted nor considered
highly reliable due to their constraints in terms of scope, applicability and security. In
order to achieve reliability and effectiveness in IDMs for Cloud, further extensive research
needs to be carried out to critically examine Cloud based IDMSs and their level of
security.
Methods: In this work, we have holistically analyzed Cloud IDMSs to better understand
the general as well as the security aspects of this domain. From the security perspective,
we present a comprehensive list of attacks that occur frequently in Cloud based IDMSs.
In order to alleviate those attacks, we present a well-organized taxonomy tree covering
the most desired features essential for any Cloud-based IDMSs. Additionally, we have
specified various mechanisms of realization (such as access control polices, encryption,
self-service) against each of the features of Cloud IDMSs. We have further used the
proposed taxonomy as an assessment criterion for the evaluation of Cloud based IDMSs.
Results: Our in-depth analysis of various Cloud based IDMSs reveals that most of
the systems do not offer support to all the essential features of Cloud IDMS and the
ones that do, have their own certain weaknesses. None of the discussed techniques
heuristically covers all the security features; moreover, they lack compliance to
international standards which, understandably, undermines their credibility.
Conclusion: Presented work will help Cloud subscribers and providers in understanding
the available solutions as well as the involved risks, allowing them to make more
knowledgeable decisions while selecting potential Cloud IDMSs that best suits their
functional and security requirements.
Keywords: Cloud computing security; Identitymanagement; Assessment criteria; IDMS
taxonomy
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Background
Cloud computing has emerged as a relatively new and influential paradigm for manag-
ing and delivering internet-based services and is considered to be an evolution of grid
computing, which itself is based on traditional distributed system concepts (Youseff et al.
2008). Cloud computing offers many benefits to the IT industry by offering them unlim-
ited storage and computing capacity. In addition, Cloud is based on pay-as-you-usemodel
that allows organizations to outsource their data and IT services, offering on-demand
self-service, broad network access and rapid elasticity at low cost (Mahmood 2011;
Wang and Mu 2011). Cloud, being a service oriented computing architecture, is capa-
ble of providing anything-as-a-service, including but not limited to Software-as-a-service
(SaaS), Platform-as-a-service (PaaS), Infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), Database-as-a-
service (DbaaS) or Identity-as-a-service (IDaaS). Google (PaaS), Amazon (PaaS and IaaS)
and Salesforce (SaaS) are few examples of major Cloud Service Providers (CSP) that
offer on-demand and low-cost services/applications to the Cloud Service Consumers
(CSC).
Another aspect of the Cloud systems is complexity. The problem in understanding
cloud systems stems from the fact that it is simply quite difficult to model them. Cloud is
a very dynamic system with numerous users, devices and networks, connecting and dis-
connecting simultaneously with the cloud. This complexity is to such an extent that it can
perhaps be likened to the complexity of a human brain where neurons connect and change
their synaptic structure continuously to store information. However, what is a problem
here is the fact that unlike the brain, where the connecting neurons are already authen-
ticated, cloud systems require extensive authentication as well as identity management
systems. Still, these are simply not enough to cater for the ever-growing requirements of
novel paradigms such as the Internet of Things (IoT) in relation to its connectivity with
the cloud.
Despite the very attractive features that Cloud promises, the rate of migration to
Cloud is rather slow, mainly due to the inherent security challenges associated with
the technology. These challenges include data privacy, transparency, risk manage-
ment, compliance and information security (Fox et al. 2009; Jansen 2011; Subashini
and Kavitha 2011). Consequently, the security of Cloud paradigm has become a hot
research area, which is being explored by both academic and industrial research com-
munities. In this regard, issues related to the handling and management of sensitive
identity credentials have garnered a lot of interest amongst the research communi-
ties (Albeshri and Caelli 2010; Chen and Zhao 2012; Gunjan et al. 2012). Storage
and processing of identity information by a third party (CSP), outside the organiza-
tional boundary, brings in loss of control and transparency issues. This contributes
to the reluctance of organizations to move their critical identity information to
Cloud.
Cloud based Identity Management Systems (IDMSs) differ from the traditional IDMSs
in that they require dynamic governance of provisioning, de-provisioning, synchroniza-
tion, entitlement, scalability and access control (Gopalakrishnan 2009; Jansen 2011). In
addition to this, Cloud IDMSs are required to have updated and synchronized identity
information to avoid any conflicts caused by the usage of old user data. Management of
sensitive identity information in the Cloud environment raises many privacy and confi-
dentiality concerns. Moreover, security requirements vary from CSC to CSC; therefore,
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it is very important to choose the most suitable identity management system that best
supports the CSC’s security requirements.
An extensive survey on existing Cloud identity management related literature reveals
that it is quite dispersed and mainly covers only few specific security features at a
time; for instance authentication, authorization and access right delegation etc. Sev-
eral Cloud identity management systems (Ates et al. 2011; Chowdhury and Noll
2007; Choudhury et al. 2011; Ranchal et al. 2010) have been proposed so far; how-
ever, none of those systems holistically meet the requirements of the IT industry,
which necessitate a comprehensive identity management system for Cloud. Addition-
ally, to be effective in Cloud, IDMSs are required to incorporate all the essential
functional and security features of this paradigm. Furthermore, there exists no bench-
mark against which one can evaluate existing and newly proposed Cloud identity
management systems. As a result, whenever a CSC or CSP needs to opt for an
identity management system, they are left unclear about what an IDMS is offering
(in terms of their services) and how their security or privacy requirements will be
fulfilled.
After reviewing many state-of-the-art Cloud based IDMSs, we present a com-
prehensive list of attacks that involve identity either as an attack tool or as a
target. Keeping in view the potential attacks and security requirements of Cloud
IDMSs, we have identified attacks and proposed key features that should be a
part of every Cloud IDMS. Presented taxonomy would help IT professionals and
researchers understand the importance of these features that are worth consider-
ing when implementing or selecting an IDMS for Cloud. We have presented those
identified features in the form of a well-organized taxonomy, and have suggested
ideal mechanisms for providing said features. As a test case, we have applied the
proposed taxonomy as an assessment criterion for the evaluation of existing Cloud
IDMSs.
This paper presents a holistic view of identity management domain: a brief introduc-
tion about the evolution of IDMSs followed by identity lifecycle management, categories
of IDMSs, list of attacks that can be launched against an IDMS, features pertaining to
the security of IDMSs in the form of well-informed taxonomy etc. The paper is fur-
ther organized as follows: Section ‘Identity lifecycle management’ describes the identity
lifecycle management. Further, the novel concept of identity-as-a-service is presented
in Section ‘Cloud Identity-as-a-Service (IDaaS)’. Evolution of identity management sys-
tems is discussed in Section ‘Classification of identity management systems’, whereas
Section ‘Open-source cloud platforms & identity management’ presents a comprehensive
list of well-known open-source Cloud computing platforms and highlight their identity
management services and properties. Section ‘Cloud identity management: security chal-
lenges’ highlights many open IDM related security issues and challenges. Well-known
attacks against Cloud IDMSs are presented in Section ‘Cloud identity management:
known attack matrix’. Taxonomy based on the proposed security features is elaborated
in Section ‘Methods’. Section ‘Results’ comprises of the evaluation of Cloud iden-
tity management systems using the proposed taxonomy. Section ‘Discussion’ highlights
current gaps, challenges and future key-trends related to Cloud identity management
systems. Finally, the Section ‘Conclusion’ highlights the key-points derived out of this
study.
Habiba et al. Complex Adaptive SystemsModeling 2014, 2:5 Page 4 of 37
http://www.casmodeling.com/content/2/1/5
Identity lifecycle management
Identity management systems are primarily responsible for the storage, maintenance and
retrieval of CSC credentials for either authentication, authorization or some other busi-
ness functions. The process of identity lifecycle management is the same for Cloud based
and conventional systems. Identity lifecycle management encompasses the whole process
of identity creation, management of account changes, password management and dele-
tion or de-activation of CSC account in a synchronized manner (Gopalakrishnan 2009),
as shown in Figure 1. We have explained each phase of identity lifecycle management in
the following subsections.
User Provisioning: Provisioning is also referred to as on-boarding or creation of CSC
account by an identity management system (Gopalakrishnan 2009; Meier et al. 2009;
Slone 2004). In a Cloud environment, IDMS typically ensure CSC’s provisioning via
Just-in-time or On-demand user provisioning techniques. Cloud based IDMSs support
provisioning via Service Provisioning Markup Language (SPML) or Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML) (Maler et al. 2003; Sodhi 2004). When new CSC subscribes
for any Cloud service at CSP, IDMS creates his account and stores all the required
information. Cloud IDMS assigns identity credentials to the CSC that he uses while
acquiring/accessing various Cloud resources. IDMS further defines CSC roles and asso-
ciates them with certain services to ensure authorized access to the Cloud services,
resources and data.
Account changes/management: Over the course of time, CSC might subscribe for other
Cloud services or resources; such an activity requires consistent adjustment in the CSC’s
account information (Gopalakrishnan 2009;Meier et al. 2009; Slone 2004). For instance, if
CSC’s title or role is changed from Assistant Manager to Manager then the identity man-
agement system is required to change the account details accordingly and timely. Other
reasons of account modification include change in access privileges or attribute values.
Thus, Cloud identity management system is required to accommodate all the changes
to CSC account across all the systems in a consistent and synchronized manner. It helps
avoid any potential conflicts or security breaches such as unauthorized or illegal access to
Cloud resources.
User De-Provisioning: De-provisioning or account deactivation is another important
phase of identity life-cycle management (Gopalakrishnan 2009; Meier et al. 2009; Slone
Figure 1 Identity life-cycle management.
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2004). In a Cloud environment, de-provisioning means real time revocation that involves
a synchronized deletion or suspension of CSC’s account along with immediate termi-
nation of his access rights from all the organizational services and resources at Cloud.
Any delay in de-provisioning could lead to many security risks like malicious use of
privileges.
Cloud Identity-as-a-Service (IDaaS)
Cloud Identity as a Service (IDaaS) is essentially the management of identities in the
cloud, outside the organizational boundary and applications that use them. The service is
provided as third party management of identity functions, including user life cycle man-
agement and single sign-on. The term IDaaS is quite broad, and encompasses all three
service layers of Cloud computing paradigm including software, platform, or infrastruc-
ture; and for both public and private clouds. Hybrid solutions may also exist, whereby
identities can still be managed internally within an organization, while other compo-
nents such as authentication, authorization etc. are externalized through Service Oriented
Architecture (SOA). IDaaS besides providing desired identity management services offers
all of the Cloud benefits as well, including reduced hardware cost, easy management with
wide range of integration options etc. (Rimal et al. 2009; Subashini and Kavitha 2011).
For that reason, most of the organizations are moving their existing enterprise IDMSs to
Cloud based services.
However, externalizing any portion of identity management functions to third-party
provided IDaaS provider may raise several security and privacy challenges as well, which
mainly includes identity data locality, confidentiality, trust establishment, availability
etc. IDaaS may provide a level of benefit to an organization when it comes to func-
tions like account management for an enterprise’s SaaS partners, but in the short-term
only. Identity management services are still best when managed internally, since, iden-
tity management represents the keys to the kingdom and IDaaS vendors don’t take on
the risk associated with losing critical identity information. Besides that, from an iden-
tity management perspective, there are a number of other uncertainties that have arisen
with the concept of IDaaS, such as a clear definition of what exactly identity services are
and what type of functionality is to be expected, application developers must adhere to
SOA requirements, interoperability must be satisfied along with defining an Application
Programming Interface (API) model that facilitates IDaaS development among many
others.
Classification of identity management systems
Identity management systems have actively followed the IT evolution, initiating from
Cluster computing followed by Grid and Peer-to-Peer systems that have now trans-
formed into Cloud computing paradigm (Slone 2004; Youseff et al. 2008). Cloud Identity
management is a broad, fascinating and continuously evolving domain with some mis-
conceptions regarding its features and services, thus, requiring further investigation.
Various Cloud identity management solutions exist and in order to highlight their
strengths, weaknesses and suitability for Cloud, we have characterized them on the basis
of their deployment architecture and functional behavior. Figure 2 presents the classifi-
cation of identity management systems followed by a brief description for each of these
systems.
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Figure 2 Classification of Cloud Identity Management Systems.
Deployment based classification
Deployment based classification includes the Isolated, Centralized or Federated identity
management architectures. This classification mainly deals with underlying architecture
for the storage, management and flow of identity information. Identity information can
be stored on a single storage server or it could be distributed across various servers,
considering the requirements of CSCs and CSPs.
1. Isolated Cloud IDMS Isolated Cloud Identity management system is based on the
common deployment model used by the small or medium organizations. In an iso-
lated Cloud IDMS, single server acts as a Service Provider (SP) as well as the Identity
Provider (IdP) and is responsible for the storage of identity information and user
operations (Alrodhan and Mitchell 2010; Cao and Yang 2010; Jøsang et al. 2005).
A common use case is depicted in Figure 3, prior to the service acquisition, (1.1)
CSCs are required to perform authentication at the CSP. Here, CSP redirects the
user’s authentication request to its own IdP for further processing. After successful
authentication, (1.2) an authentication response is generated and returned to the cor-
responding user. This identity management system does not rely on a Trusted Third
Party (TTP) for the credential issuance and verification. However, Isolated IDMS
becomes unmanageable with the increase in services and resources, since each service
needs to know the credentials of authorized users (Cao and Yang 2010; Jøsang et al.
2005).
2. Centralized Cloud IDMS Centralized Cloud identity management system is slightly
different from the isolated IDMS, since it separates the functions of SP and IdP. In a
centralized IDMS, a single IdP (a trusted third party) is responsible for the issuance,
Figure 3 Isolated IDMS.
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storage and management of identity data (Cao and Yang 2010; Jøsang et al. 2005;
Windley 2005). As a first step, IdP collects all the identity information from CSPs
to manage centrally. Later, (1.1) CSC sends an authentication request to CSP, (2.1)
Authn request is redirected to the concerned IdP, (2.2) Authn response is sent back to
the CSP (1.2) CSC will receive the Authn response (either successful or an error mes-
sage), as depicted in Figure 4. Typically, single CSC may avail the services of different
CSPs that may have a common IdP. In this scenario, CSPs and CSCs are required to
have a common trusted IdP since it is responsible for the handling of sensitive iden-
tity credentials. An obvious drawback of the centralized IDMS model is single point
of failure.
3. Federated Cloud IDMS Federated Cloud identity management system is the realiza-
tion of federated identity management model that enables the subscribers of multiple
organizations to use the same identification information for acquiring access to all
the networks within any particular trusted group of enterprises (Cao and Yang 2010;
Chen et al. 2012; Jøsang et al. 2005). Federated Cloud Identity management system
has received significant attention from the IT industry because of its design agility that
inherently allows cross-domain access to its users by eliminating the need of creating
additional user accounts for external parties (Arias-Cabarcos et al. 2012; Shin et al.
2009; Suriadi et al. 2009). Federated IDMS follows the distributed storage architec-
ture, where identity information is stored at multiple locations. The workflow of user
request and service provider’s response is depicted in Figure 5, where (1) CSC for-
wards an authentication request to the CSP1, (1.1), the CSP1 being a federated IDMS,
forwards the authentication request to the CSP2 for the collection of CSC’s iden-
tity credentials. As a next step, (1.2) CSP2 forwards the authentication request to the
next IdP and retrieves the required attributes from its Identity data store. Finally, an
authentication response is created and sent back to the requesting CSP. This process
continues until it collects all the attributes required for authentication. In a federated
IDMS, CSC’s authentication request results in the linking of their information across
multiple IdPs, so as to enhance security.
Feature based classification
The functional behavior class includes Anonymous and User-centric identity manage-
ment systems. These systems are independent of underlying architecture for instance, a
Figure 4 Centralized IDMS.
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Figure 5 Federated IDMS.
User-Centric IDMS might be based on federated identity management architecture, or it
may follow the centralized identity management approach for the management and stor-
age of identity credentials. In the functional behavior class, the key emphasis is on the
functionality of the identity management system such as User-centricity and Anonymity.
1. User-Centric Cloud IDMSUser-centric Cloud identitymanagement system involves
user in every identity provisioning transaction. As shown in Figure 6, in order to
acquire any service, (1.1) CSCs sends a credential request to the concerned IdP, 1.2)
the IdP responses back with all the required credential that are needed to perform
authentication. In a User-centric identity management system, CSCs are responsi-
ble for the storage, management and retrieval of their personal identity information.
It further requires the CSCs to take decisions about the exchange of their identity
credentials with other trusted entities such as CSPs, IdPs or users (Alrodhan and
Mitchell 2010; Bhargav-Spantzel et al. 2007; Cao and Yang 2010; Suriadi et al. 2009). In
Figure 6 User-centricIDMS.
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addition, user-centric IDMSs improve privacy by considering user preferences before
disclosing the identity information to the SPs. However, in a service-oriented architec-
ture like Cloud, each application/service requires the CSC to perform authentication
and authorization, which is rather cumbersome for the CSC.
2. Anonymous Cloud IDMS An identity management system that offers anonymity as
a feature is termed as an anonymous identity management system. An Anonymous
Cloud identity management system is capable of keeping its entity (owner) secret
from everyone else (Bhargav-Spantzel et al. 2007; Conrado et al. 2003; McCallister
2010). Anonymous identity should be strong enough to make it hard, if not impracti-
cal, to reveal actual identity because data inferred eventually may be connected with
other information and can be republished (Bhargav-Spantzel et al. 2007; Conrado
et al. 2003). However, anonymous identity management also has some shortcomings,
such as lack of trust between the CSCs, and CSPs. It further seems to be negating the
purpose of logging and monitoring, since the service consumer is performing actions
using some temporary identity.
Open-source cloud platforms & identity management
In this section we present a comprehensive list of well-known open-source Cloud
computing platforms and highlight their identity management services and properties.
Eucalyptus - identity & access management
EUCALYPTUS is the acronym for Elastic Utility Computing Architecture for Linking Your
Program to Useful System, which is an open source private cloud software for building
private or hybrid cloud resources for compute, network, and storage that are compatible
with Amazon Web Service (AWS) APIs (Kumar et al. 2014). Identity and Access Manage-
ment (IAM) is an authentication, authorization, and accounting system feature within the
Eucalyptus private cloud software that is responsible for the management of user iden-
tities, enforcement of access controls over resources and providing reports on resource
usage as a basis for auditing and managing cloud activities. Eucalyptus by default stores
all of the identities and policies in the local Cloud Controller (CLC) database (Eucalyptus
Identity and Access Management IAM 2012). Identity data can also be pulled from LDAP
or Active Directory. The user identity organizational model and the scheme of authoriza-
tions are compatible with the AWS Identity and Access Management system with some
Eucalyptus extensions that support private clouds. Some of its key benefits include secure
credentials management along with efficient and flexible policy based resource access and
utilization management.
OpenStack identity service - keystone
OpenStack is an open source cloud computing project that has rapidly become very pop-
ular since its first release on October 21st, 2010 (Kumar et al. 2014). OpenStack mainly
consist of three core software project which are OpenStack Compute Infrastructure -
Nova, Object Storage Infrastructure - Swift and Image Service Infrastructure - Glance.
The default identity management system for OpenStack is the OpenStack Identity Ser-
vice, named as Keystone. Keystone integrates the OpenStack functions for authentication,
policy management, and catalog services, including registering all tenants (customer,
account, or any organizational unit) and users (person, system, or service), authenticating
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users and granting tokens for authorization, creating policies that span all users and ser-
vices, and managing a catalog of service endpoints (Rhoton 2013). The existing Keystone
implementation is centralized, where all users are required to be enrolled in its database,
either manually by the OpenStack administrator (via a command line interface or
Horizon), or via bulk loading from a corporate database such as LDAP, prior to their
access to any of the services. There are a number of well-known limitations with this
design, such as users having accounts in multiple systems have to remember multiple
credentials for each one.
OpenNebula - users & groupmanagement
OpenNebula was first established as a research project back in 2005 and was used by
many enterprises as an open and flexible Cloud virtualization infrastructure on their
VMware-based data center enabling highly scalable hosting environments (Kumar et al.
2014). OpenNebula includes a complete user & group management system. Users in
an OpenNebula installation are classified into four types, Administrators, (user belongs
to an admin group), Regular users (may access most OpenNebula functionality), Public
users (may access only public interfaces) and Service users (user with OpenNebula ser-
vice account). The resources a user may access in OpenNebula are typically controlled by
a permissions system that resembles the typical UNIX one. By default, only the owner of
a resource (VM/image) can use and manage it. Users can easily share the resources by
granting use or manage permissions to other users in their group or to any other user in
the system. Furthermore, OpenNebula comes with an internal user/password authentica-
tion system; however, an external authentication driver may also be enabled if required.
OpenNebula further supports three customizable authentication configurations; namely,
Command Line (CLI) (basic user/password, X509, LDAP), Sunstone (SSL proxy - Apache)
and Servers authentication.
Cloud identity management: security challenges
Identity management is a broad domain that involves many open security issues and
challenges includingOpenness, Identity Theft, Least Privileges, Elevated Privilege Control,
Availability, Confidentiality, Integrity, Trust Management etc (Cloud Security Alliance
SecaaS Guidance, Category 1: Identity and Access Management, 2012 by Cloud Secu-
rity Alliance 2013). Since, technology area such as Cloud Identity Management is still
evolving, thus, no well-established standards have been developed so far, resulting in
issues like vendor lock-in and lack of openness (availability of specifications/data for-
mats/protocols). Openness is critical, so that converters can be developed in the future
to ensure interoperability and scalability. Further, since identity information could be
accessed by unauthorized or malicious users/intruders. Therefore, adequate security
(encryption, authentication access control, monitoring, etc.) mechanisms are required to
be in place for accessing identity and administration interfaces; otherwise, unauthorized
access over the network (eavesdropping) would be a key risk factor (Kumaraswamy et al.
2010). In addition to this, Cloud IDMS must subscribe to the principle of Least Privi-
lege and proceed using a work-flow mechanism for additional approvals. However, since
least privilege not only involves static roles and resources, but also complex context, and
dynamic changes (both technical and non-technical). Thus, many Cloud IDMS deploy-
ments today enormously over-provision effective access rights to users who even do not
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require those access rights. Such excessive access provisioning leads to many critical
security issues including unauthorized disclosure, fraud, accidental access and identity
theft.
Another most critical aspect of identity management is Privilege Access Manage-
ment. Besides traditional audit and logging requirements, privilege access needs to
be a governance mechanism as well. Since, most enterprise applications suffer from
mismanagement of roles, violation of segregation of duties, therefore reporting (both
success and failure events) on this aspect becomes crucial. Moreover, attacks on
identity services or network connectivity, such as DDoS attacks or resource hogging,
could risk the availability or degrade the performance of an IDMS. If high avail-
ability and/or performance are required, redundancy and fail-over options must be
considered. Aside from this, due to the ubiquitous nature of Cloud, it is accessi-
ble through various devices and applications resulting in an increased number of
access points, which sooner or later, adds to the threat of unauthorized disclo-
sure (confidentiality) of identity credentials from both insiders (staff ) and outsiders
(users/intruders) (Mather et al. 2009). Similarly, considering the increased num-
ber of access points and system entities, integrity of identity data and informa-
tion stored at Cloud is another important concern which needs immediate attention
(Halpert 2011; Lang 2010). In addition to the above-mentioned issues, manage-
ment of trust between the Cloud identity provider and the subscriber is one of
the main issues that today’s Cloud IDMSs is dealing with. Furthermore, trust is
a subjective and context sensitive term which makes it even more difficult to
select a Cloud identity provider with fully trusted identity services (Pearson and
Benameur 2010).
Cloud identity management: known attackmatrix
Currently, a lot of research is focused on Cloud identity management systems; how-
ever, security of Cloud IDMSs is an aspect that is still in nascent stages, and requires
further exploration. Existing IDMSs are susceptible to various security and perfor-
mance bottlenecks, which limits their widespread adoption as a potential solution for
dynamic Cloud environment. Therefore, we have contributed to this part by con-
ducting a survey on state-of-the-art Cloud based identity management systems and
security issues. We present a list of attacks that are either launched against IDMSs
or use identity as a principal tool for attack. A brief description of all the identi-
fied attacks is presented in Table 1. In addition to this, we have assigned a unique
label to each identified attack that we use later in this paper to refer to these attacks.
The compiled list aided in determining the key security features that a Cloud based
IDMS must provide to ensure the protection and security of Identity credentials in
Cloud.
In addition to the attacks, we have also identified the features for Cloud IDMSs that are
capable of alleviating the impact of most if not all of the attacks mentioned here. Along
with the list of eminent Cloud IDMS features, we have also provided a list of mechanisms
that help achieve the identified features. Strengths and weaknesses of each mechanism
are also specified wherever required. Cloud IDMS features along with the mechanisms
























Table 1 Known Attacks against Cloud IDMSs
Label Attack Description
A1 Brute-force attack Brute-force attack generally allows the attacker to gain unauthorized access to sensitive identity credentials of CSCs stored in an identity
management server using different possible combinations for user ID and password. Dictionary attack is one example of brute force attack
that might be launched against an IDMS if it fails to comply with international standards of strong password settings. Once successful, attacker
intensifies their attack in an attempt to uncover the security holes or vulnerabilities of an IDMS. They analyze the server responses andmanipulate
them to achieve their malicious purposes (Almorsy et al. 2010; Brute Force Attack; Kumaraswamy et al. 2010; Meier et al. 2009; O’Gorman 2003;
Ratha et al. 2001; Yassin et al. 2012).
A2 Cookie-replay attack Here the attacker steals a cookie containing valid session information along with the CSC’s identity credentials and reuses it to trick the identity
management server into believing that a previously authenticated session is still ongoing and authentic. Through this attack method, attacker
may get unauthorized access to victim’s (person whose credentials are stolen) confidential information other than Cloud services and resources
(Meier et al. 2009).
A3 Data Tampering Attack It refers to the unauthorized modification of data related to identification of CSC in an identity data-store at Cloud. These modifications may
provide the attacker with an opportunity to transgress and damage the Cloud services and resources. This is the attack on the integrity of
identity information stored at Cloud mainly due to the loopholes in access control systems (Angin et al. 2010; Meier et al. 2009; Ranchal et al.
2010; Subashini and Kavitha 2011; Thompson et al. 2006).
A4 Denial of Service (DOS) Attack DoS attack can be launched against an IDMS if it does not provide mechanisms for logging user activities. Since in a DoS attack, attacker
overwhelms the Cloud identity management server with false authentication or authorization requests (malformed input data) and tries to
either stop the service or consume all of its available resources so that it may not be able to process the legitimate user requests (Almorsy
et al. 2010; Meier et al. 2009; Thompson et al. 2006). Therefore, proper logging mechanisms are required to be ensured, so as to make the IDMS
intelligent enough to detect and prevent such attacks.
A5 Eavesdropping This is the attack at communication level, when the Cloud identity management server and CSC exchange the identity credentials for
authentication or authorization purpose. It refers to the unauthorized real-time interception and stealing of sensitive consumer information by
the attacker either through listening or reading the un-encrypted sensitive data off the network (Bhadauria et al. 2011; Jansen 2011; Jansen and
Grance 2011; Jensen et al. 2009; Meier et al. 2009).
A6 Elevation of Privilege Privilege escalation attack involves legitimate subscribers of the IDMSwith limited set of privileges. They illegitimately escalate their access rights
by impersonating other CSC that has higher privileges than theirs in order to achieve their illicit objectives and may cause severe damage to
the stored information (Meier et al. 2009; Saripalli and Walters 2010; Subashini and Kavitha 2011; Thompson et al. 2006).
A7 Identity Forgery/Cloning/Spoofing Attack It refers to the unauthorized copying or manipulation of identity tokens or credentials issued from the trustworthy authorities (such as CSP
or government), with the intent to deceive or mislead the investigation if followed. Cloud based IDMS should be able to detect the forged
identity by implying strict (two-factor) authentication mechanisms. Forged identities further help in committing fraud and identity theft and
requires expert knowledge, exceptional skill-set and sometimes much greater effort than the benefits achieved (Chang 2003; Choudhury et al.
2011; Jensen et al. 2009; Kumaraswamy et al. 2010; Meier et al. 2009; Nabeel et al. 2011; Saripalli and Walters 2010; Subashini and Kavitha 2011;























Table 1 Known Attacks against Cloud IDMSs (Continued)
A8 Identity Theft Identity theft refers to the stealing of someone’s identity (such as their name, personally identifiable information, or credit card number), with
the intent to acquire Cloud resources or other financial benefits in that victim’s name. The victim of identity theft may undergo adverse
consequences if they are held responsible for the actions of actual delinquent. In addition to this, identity theft further paves the way for many
other crimes such as fraud and forgery (Angin et al. 2010; Ranchal et al. 2010).
A9 Luring Attack An IDMS that neither ensures user-centricity (such as consistent user experience) nor provides logging & reportingmechanisms is considered to
be more prone to luring attack. It is a more specialized form of privilege escalation attack, where the authorized service consumer unknowingly
executes the attacker’s code fragment in a more privileged security context. More precisely, the adversary targets and ‘lures’ a high-privileged
CSC to perform some illegal activities on their behalf (Angin et al. 2010; Meier et al. 2009).
A10 Phishing Attack IDMS that offers no support to user-centricity, strong password schemes and privacy preservation considerations is more vulnerable to phishing
attack. Phishing is an act of acquiring CSC’s information such as name, passwords, social security number, bank account numbers and credit
card details by redirecting the CSC to enter his particulars to some replica website whose look and feel is almost identical to the authentic one.
Attacker manipulates the communication so that they may appear to be from a legitimate IdP to successfully lure the unsuspicious CSC (Angin
et al. 2010; Jansen 2011; Jansen and Grance 2011; Jensen et al. 2009; Kumaraswamy et al. 2010; Olden 2011).
A11 Replay Attack Replay attack occurs when an IDMS fails to ensure the security of identity credentials during their transmission. In a replay attack, adversary
captures the valid identification information and retransmits it, possibly as part of impersonation attack. Unless mitigated, the IDMS subject
to the attack, processes user request as an authentic message, resulting in a range of bad consequences, such as unauthorized disclosure of
information followed by fraud, forgery and impersonation (Almorsy et al. 2010; Choudhury et al. 2011; Jansen 2011; Jansen and Grance 2011).
A12 Repudiation Repudiation attack occurs when the Cloud service consumer denies an action. In addition to this, the Cloud IDMS does not implement any
controls to maintain service consumer activity logs so no proof exists to prove him accountable for his actions. Due to the absence of real-time
tracking and activity logging mechanisms, service consumers can easily repudiate their malicious activities that they have actually performed
on Cloud servers, such as unauthorized manipulation of data and forgery of identity credentials (Bertino and Takahashi 2010; Thompson et al.
2006; Yan et al. 2009; Zissis and Lekkas 2012).
A13 Side-Channel Attack An IDMS may fall victim to side channel attack if it does not follow the principle of federation and access control. As in the side channel
attack, attacker steals the information (like session identifiers, timing information, OAuth tokens and electromagnetic leaks) from the physical
implementation of a security system. Therefore, it is recommended to deploy a federated IDMS that stores the sensitive identity information in
fragments across multiple servers in order to make it hard for the attacker to achieve his malicious objectives (Angin et al. 2010; Bhadauria et al.
2011; Jansen 2011; Jensen et al. 2009; Ranchal et al. 2010; Zhou and Feng 2005).
A14 Skimming Attack Since skimming is an attack method where criminals steal the sensitive information from authentication tokens (smart card). IDMS should be
capable of ensuring strong encryption and secure distribution of identity credentials across multiple servers (Jacobs and Poll 2011; Zissis and
Lekkas 2012).
A15 Snooping Snooping attack permits the illegitimate collection of sensitive information such as identities, available services and network topology from
an identity server in Cloud environment. Snooping is slightly different from eavesdropping since it includes more sophisticated surveillance
techniques to intercept secret communications such as through remote activity and key-stroke (key-loggers) monitors (Donevski et al. 2013;
Salsano et al. 2002).
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Methods
Cloud IDMS features &mechanisms: a taxonomy
Having compiled a list of potential attacks against IDMSs, we move on to identifying
the most imperative Cloud IDMS features that are required to ensure the security of
CSC’s credentials. Most of the identified features do exist for traditional IDMSs, but
as Cloud brings in new security challenges, we need to revisit them from the perspec-
tive of Cloud environment. In this respect, Ferdous et al. in (Ferdous and Poet 2012)
have presented a very comprehensive taxonomy covering almost all the functional and
non-functional requirements of an identitymanagement system including usability, trust-
worthiness, affordability, security and privacy, as shown in Figure 7. However, among
all these requirements, security is one key factor that is categorically considered as the
most important requirement, and has not been covered in detail thus requires further
investigation and exploration. Therefore, in this paper, we have extended their work
and provided a well-informed taxonomy (as shown in Figure 8) - that thoroughly cov-
ers all the required Cloud IDMS security features and their corresponding mechanisms
of realization. Whereas, for other aspects such as usability, affordability, liability & law
enforcement etc., we affirm the taxonomy presented in Ferdous and Poet (2012) to be reli-
able and adequate, since it is inclusive of all the crucial requirements. Finally, detailed
description of all the identified Cloud IDMS features, along with their mechanisms, is
presented in the following subsections.
Authentication
An identity management system has a primary objective of authenticating users or sub-
scribers registered with it. Authentication is the process of verification that ensures
whether the person or the application is actually the one or who it claims to be (Jansen
2011; Pashalidis and Mitchell 2003; Shin et al. 2009; Slone 2004; Subashini and Kavitha
2011; Windley 2005; You et al. 2012). In the multi-tenant Cloud environment, users and
computer programs are required to prove their identity/legitimacy to the authentica-
tion service whenever they attempt to access some application or while acquiring a web
resource. Authentication can be provided as a part of an IDMS or it may exist as a separate
Figure 7 Taxonomy of Identity Management Requirements.
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Figure 8 Taxonomy tree of cloud IDMS Components andMechanisms.
service/system. Authentication commonly relies upon at least one of the factors described
below considering the security requirements of the service, since highly secure services
require stronger authentication mechanism.
1. Something you know The conventional and the easiest way of authentication is via
password or Personal Identification Number (PIN), something that is shared between
the user and the authentication service and is, ideally, both secret and hard to guess.
Identity management systems are responsible for the storage, management and secure
transmission of user ID and password to the authentication service for verification.
In a common Cloud hosted web-service access scenario, user enters his user ID and
password/PIN to prove his identity to the authentication server. However, this mech-
anism is considered to be the least secure authentication mechanism for the dynamic
Cloud environment that is susceptible to replay attack and identity theft since user
passwords/PIN can easily be stolen. Other reasons might include sharing of pass-
words or usage of overly simplistic passwords among many others. Password based
authenticationmechanisms can be enhanced if applied as One-Time-Password (OTP)
scheme (Luo et al. 2009; Olden 2011), Challenge-Response mechanism (Choudhury
et al. 2011) and Single-Sign-On (SSO) (Ates et al. 2011; Chadwick and Casenove 2011;
Choudhury et al. 2011; Kim et al. 2010), each offering different levels of security.
OTP Scheme: Cloud based IDMS can authenticate users via OTP scheme also
(Olden 2011), where user authentication is performed each time with new password
that is randomly generated and has no likability to the one used for previous transac-
tion or resource acquisition (Luo et al. 2009). Thus, improves the security and privacy
of user during the entire authentication process; however, it decreases the efficiency
of the overall system since the authentication system has to generate the OTP and
transmit it to the respective user in response to every authentication request.
Challenge Response Mechanism: In order to make conventional passwords non-
reusable and secure, Cloud IDMSs can offer authentication via challenge-response
Habiba et al. Complex Adaptive SystemsModeling 2014, 2:5 Page 16 of 37
http://www.casmodeling.com/content/2/1/5
mechanism (Feng et al. 2010; Ratha et al. 2001; Saroiu and Wolman 2009). Authen-
ticator maintains a list of challenges that are later presented to the user in response
to every authentication request. User provides response to those challenges and on
the basis of the verification results, user is allowed or denied by the service provider.
Challenge-response mechanism also has certain weaknesses as the system is prone
to playback/replay attacks and password guessing attacks. Moreover, authentication
server is required to have a wide range of challenges each with a unique response,
which is hard to achieve practically.
OAUTH: It is an algorithm developed by Initiative for Open authentication and
is based on a challenge-response algorithm (Almorsy et al. 2010; Gopalakrishnan
2009; Olden 2011). This algorithm offers one-way authentication as well as mutual
authentication, and has digital signatures capability also, so is widely adopted as an
authentication mechanism by the Cloud IDMS providers and is widely trusted by
CSPs and CSCs.
SSO: In order to facilitate the users, Cloud IDMSs offer SSO capability that does
not require its users to remember a large number of passwords. SSO is a onetime
assertion or authentication per session/per credential where users can access multiple
trusted services or resources at Cloud using a single user ID and password (Chadwick
and Casenove 2011; Kim et al. 2010; Pashalidis and Mitchell 2003; Suriadi et al. 2009).
Organizations may maintain their independent IDMSs but authentication is provided
via unique user credentials. An individual’s identity information stored across various
identity management systems is linked to those unique credentials while perform-
ing authentication. SSO controls access among many interrelated, but autonomous
systems (Jansen 2011) and can be achieved via any of the following mechanisms.
(a) OpenID: OpenID is an authentication protocol whose main objective is to
minimize the number of credentials that a user needs to maintain for the pur-
pose of accessingmultiple Cloud services (Angin et al. 2010; Celesti et al. 2010;
Gopalakrishnan 2009; Olden 2011; Ranchal et al. 2010). It is a type of feder-
ated identity which enables the user to access multiple services using OpenID
credentials instead of service specific user name and password. OpenID, on
behalf of user, requests the service provider for the required service. More-
over, it eliminates the chances of password disclosure, since no OpenID-based
Cloud service actually stores user’s password information.
(b) Security AssertionMarkup Language (SAML): SAML is an open standard
framed by OASIS for the representation and exchange of identity information
among various trusted CSPs while performing user authentication or identifi-
cation (Celesti et al. 2010; Gopalakrishnan 2009; Jensen et al. 2009; Maler et al.
2003; Olden 2011). SAML version 2.0 offers support to web SSO using token,
containing user identity information, that is issued by the IdP. These tokens
are recognizable to various trusted CSPs while performing user authentication
in response to the user’s SSO request.
Since, it is impractical to eliminate passwords from the authentication mechanisms,
their security can be further enhanced if they are used in conjunction with other
authentication factors and technologies such as biometrics or smart cards.
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2. Something you have Identity management systems can also offer authentication
on the basis of “something you have” that is commonly referred to as token-based
authentication and is a comparatively stronger authentication mechanism. The secret
user authentication credentials are encoded in hardware or software tokens that are
verified against the information stored by the corresponding IDMS prior to the access
of every web service/resource. However, authentication-tokens individually are also
vulnerable to identity theft attacks since these cards can be lost or stolen and the
adversary can use them for their own malicious purposes. The security of this authen-
tication mechanism can be enhanced by combining it with “something you know” for
instance a PIN code or password. Token-based authentication can be realized via any
of the following methods:
Public Key Infrastructure(PKI): Identity management systems are capable of accept-
ing digital certificates as software authentication tokens issued by the trusted certifi-
cation authority (CA). Authentication server traces back the certificate to the issuing
party in order to ensure the legitimacy of the user presenting the certificate.
Smart Card: SecureID tokens or smart cards are also accepted as valid authentica-
tion tokens by various IDMSs as smart cards are capable of storing long and hard to
recover secret user information (Cameron 2005; Ratha et al. 2001). Smart cards are
designed to be tamper resistant. Users present the smart card to the authentication
service that verifies the encoded information from its identity management database
before sanctioning the user to access any web service or resource.
Mobile Phone: Identity management systems may incorporate cellular devices
(mobile phone) having a SIM (Subscriber Identification Module) card to connect the
users to the authentication service via mobile network (Ratha et al. 2001). Mobile
phone network is used to communicate the authentication information (password)
between the user and the authenticator via SMS (Short Message Service). Authen-
tication information can be voice confirmation from the user or OTP send by the
server that the user enters afterwards to verify the legitimacy of user.
3. Something you are The final category of authentication that an IDMS can support
is based on biometrics where user verification is performed on the basis of some
natural characteristics such as fingerprint, voice patterns, or iris characteristics that
are unique for every individual (Jensen et al. 2009; Leandro et al. 2012; Senk and
Dotzler 2011).
To make the authentication system stronger, any two of the aforementioned factors can
be combined as two-factor authentication, which is considered highly secure. Most com-
monly “something you have” is combined with “something you know” e.g. smart card along
with a PIN is used to authenticate a user more securely in Cloud IDMSs.
Authorization
Authorization plays an important part in Identity management system; authorization
is the process of granting and denying access to any web resource and service (Slone
2004; Subashini and Kavitha 2011; Windley 2005; You et al. 2012). The authoriza-
tion process decides what a subject (users or applications) is allowed to do on the
system and this decision is taken by using subject’s identity information. Cloud is a
multi-provider environment where one user might have access to multiple services
each can be from a different provider having different security levels. Therefore, Cloud
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service providers are required to ensure effective authorization for their resources and
services in every possible situation. Authorization in a Cloud environment is com-
monly achieved via access control policies, defined and implemented by the CSPs for
their subjects (CSCs), so that only authorized subject may accesses the services and
resources.
Access Control Policies (ACP): Cloud service providers implement access control poli-
cies on top of identity management systems to ensure that only the legitimate users
acquire/access the services and resources they offer (Ates et al. 2011; Chadwick and
Casenove 2011; Chowdhury and Noll 2007; Hoellrigl et al. 2010). Complete knowledge
about ‘Who’ can access ‘What’ and ‘When’, gives a clear picture of the security and
protection of CSP’s resources/services. Accordingly, CSPs can take effective security mea-
sures to make illegitimate use, unauthorized modification and disclosure of their services,
relatively hard if not impractical.
Access Right Delegation: In an IDMS, delegator (person who wants to delegate
his access rights) may want to delegate his access rights of some Cloud based web-
service to some delegatee (person who receives the delegation) as desired by the
delegator or delegatee (Gopalakrishnan 2009; Hoellrigl et al. 2010; Li et al. 2010;
Zissis and Lekkas 2012). Delegation of access rights is typically based on any of the
access control models, such as Role based access control (RBAC) or Attribute based
Access Control (ABAC), where each model specifies a different mechanism for dele-
gation. For instance, in RBAC, access permissions are granted to a role that is later
linked to the concerned delegatee. However, in the process of delegation, delegator is
required to protect his privacy by restricting the delegatee (via access control poli-
cies or privacy policies) from accessing any additional identity information of the
delegator.
OAUTH: OAUTH is an open standard for authorization; it allows the service con-
sumers to access the CSP’s services or resources on the behalf of the resource/service
owner (Almorsy et al. 2010; Gopalakrishnan 2009; Olden 2011; Sanchez et al. 2012).
OAUTH follows the principle of access right delegation where resource owners dele-
gate access rights to service consumers without sharing their identity credentials (such
as user-ID and password pair). In a common OAUTH scenario, the CSC first accesses a
service/application that redirects him to the IdP, where he performs authentication and
after successful authentication, IdP redirects the service consumer back to the Cloud ser-
vice along with the identity token. From then on, service consumers access that particular
service via that token.
Identity federation
Identity management systems may offer support to identity federation that enhances the
security of identity information during the transmission and storage of credentials. Iden-
tity federation has two meanings: it can be a method of associating and communicating a
person’s digital identity and attributes that are stored across multiple Cloud based IDMSs
or it could be any standard, contract and technology that make the identity information
movable across independent domains (Arias-Cabarcos et al. 2012; Chen and Zhao 2012;
Shin et al. 2009; Slone 2004; Suriadi et al. 2009). Identity federation plays the key role
in securing user credentials while moving towards the Cloud. Identity federation can be
achieved via any of the following mechanisms:
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Multiple IdPs and SPs: An IDMS might involve multiple IdPs and CSPs for the storage
and processing of service consumer’s identity information (Celesti et al. 2010; Chadwick
and Casenove 2011; Hoellrigl et al. 2010). In other words, the identity credentials of a
single service consumer are stored at multiple Cloud servers in small chunks following the
distributed architecture. Consequently, while performing authentication, authenticator
collects the identity information from all the relevant IdPs and CSPs and processes them
as required.
Hierarchical Storage: Identity information stored in hierarchical fashion either on a
single server or on multiple nodes (typical Cloud scenario) is considered to follow the
identity federation principle (Yan et al. 2009). Hierarchical storage offers different levels
of access and improves the information accessibility and security. In the hierarchical stor-
age, IDMSs store user information with different access levels considering the sensitivity
of identity credentials; therefore, in case if any intermediate node gets compromised, the
impact of information loss will be minimal.
Distributed Computation: Distributed Computation: IDMSs are said to be following
the identity federation principle, if they follow the distributed processing architecture
for user authentication. The distributed architecture works by disseminating the identity
information among multiple Cloud servers for the computation or verification of user
credentials. This approach accelerates the authentication process and improves security
(Ates et al. 2011; Chowdhury and Noll 2007; Kim et al. 2010; Ranchal et al. 2010).
Privacy
Identity management systems are meant to store and process sensitive user credentials
that the user wants to protect from unauthorized or unwanted disclosure (Bhargav-
Spantzel et al. 2007; Cameron 2005; Leskinen 2012; McCallister 2010; Windley 2005).
Privacy is among the top most concerns of users while storing or sharing their secret
identity information for either e-commerce or other purposes. Moreover, storage of
sensitive identity information in the Cloud, which is outside the organizational bound-
aries and beyond the user control, elevates user’s privacy concerns. Listed below are the
mechanisms through which identity management systems can guarantee user privacy:
Proxy systems: Proxy can be a Cloud service or server that personifies someone else
(user/application) and acts on their behalf. Identity management systems assign a unique
credential to almost every entity be it a system, resource or a service consumer, thus rais-
ing privacy concerns (Ates et al. 2011; Olden 2011; Wang et al. 2010). Proxy is particularly
intended to enhance user’s privacy by requesting the desired Cloud resource/service on
behalf of its registered users/systems. The identifying information that is forwarded, for
either authentication or resource acquisition, is of the Cloud proxy system rather than the
actual user who has requested for the service.
User Roles: A single user might have multiple contextual identities such as personal
(name, e-mail ID), social, professional (employee-ID, Salary), and citizen (for instance
National ID card), each with different security requirements (Ates et al. 2011). In order
to ensure user’s privacy while accessing multiple Cloud services, only relevant identity
attributes must be shared. An IDMS should be capable of understanding and specify-
ing separate user roles so that only required and related information is forwarded to the
respective CSP.
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Pseudonym: Pseudonym is a temporary name that is generated either by an IdP upon
user request or by the users themselves, whenever they need to protect their privacy while
accessing a Cloud based web service/resource (Luo et al. 2009; Zhang and Chen 2010).
Pseudonyms intend to protect an individual’s true identity in an online transaction. It is
recommended to use a different pseudonym for every different Cloud service so that they
cannot be linked to the user’s original identity.
Encryption: Encryption is used to convert the identity information into some unintelli-
gible form so that even if disclosed, information might not be useful to the adversaries
(Chadwick and Casenove 2011; Kim et al. 2010; Nabeel et al. 2011). In order to ensure
privacy, Cloud based identity management systems must offer encrypted storage and
transmission of identity credentials. The key used for the encryption of identity creden-
tials is securely shared between the communicating parties only so that the information
will only be disclosed to the authorized user having the right key pair.
Limited Disclosure: The best practices regarding identity management dictates that
information should be disclosed on a “need to know” basis, and stored on a “need to retain”
basis, as that may help to ensure the minimal damage in the event of any violation such as
theft of identity information (Cameron 2005).
1. Privacy Policies: Identity management systems implement privacy policies to pro-
tect their service consumer’s identity information in accordance with their pref-
erences. Identity disclosure policies are specified and implemented at the service
consumer end (Angin et al. 2010; Celesti et al. 2010; Chowdhury and Noll 2007;
Choudhury et al. 2011; Ranchal et al. 2010; Yan et al. 2009. CSCs (data owner) demand
transparency about ‘who’ wants to access ‘what’ part of their identity information.
Whenever CSC attempts to access or acquire a Cloud service/resource, CSP needs
certain amount of identity information to verify his authenticity. Therefore, before
forwarding CSC’s credentials to the CSP, identity management system must consult
the privacy policies or may ask for the CSC’s consent prior to identity information
disclosure. It enables the CSC to decide whether they want to acquire that resource
by sharing their identity information with the CSP or if they would prefer to protect
their privacy so that they may withdraw their resource acquisition request.
2. Data disclosure policies/preferences: Commonly, user-centric IDMSs offer con-
sistent user experience by allowing the user to select the credentials and attributes
from identity attribute lists issued by the IdP, in advance, to each operation (Hoellrigl
et al. 2010; Zhang and Chen 2010). Service consumers may also specify their identity
revelation rules prior to actual service usage to ensure the security and privacy (Fox
et al. 2009; Hoellrigl et al. 2010; Zhang and Chen 2010) of their information. User
centric IDMSs allow its users to choose an IdP of their own choice which they believe
is more appropriate for any particular transaction thus, places greater responsibility
in the hands of users.
User-centricity
User centricity is an important identity management feature which emphasizes on trans-
ferring the control of identity attributes and disclosure preferences in the hands of identity
possessor (CSC). In a user-centric IDMS, CSCs are involved in every identity provision-
ing operation and have full control over their online identity information (Dhamija and
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Dusseault 2008; Leskinen 2012;Windley 2005). CSCs are responsible for the management
of their identity credentials; however, user-centric systems have problems in terms of
security and privacy. Following are the mechanisms through which identity management
systems provide user centricity to the Cloud service consumers.
Consistent User Experience: Identity management systems are required to offer sup-
port to various technologies (e.g. OpenID, SAML, OAuth) run by multiple IdPs to
ensure the interoperability among various systems (Cameron 2005; Celesti et al. 2010;
Chowdhury and Noll 2007; Ranchal et al. 2010). An IDMS that supports interoperability
among various identity management systems (by either offering support to multiple tech-
nologies or by following common schema for the exchange of identity credentials) help to
ensure consistent user experience while accessing multiple services.
Self-service: Identity management systems are required to provide a self-service feature
that enables the user to alter his sensitive personal information stored by the Cloud ser-
vice providers (such as postal address, phone number, password etc.) (Ates et al. 2011;
Choudhury et al. 2011; Luo et al. 2009). Usersmust be allowed tomodify/update their per-
sonal identification information that uniquely identifies them in an IDMS. It also reduces
the SP’s operational costs and troubleshooting time.
Logging & auditing
Identity management systems incorporate logging and auditing feature that helps to
ensure the proper working of identity management system and gain the trust of its
customers/users in the system (Bhargav-Spantzel et al. 2007; Windley 2005). In a multi-
tenant Cloud environment, it is comparatively harder to identify the person responsible
for any security breach or misbehavior. Therefore, Cloud IDMSs are required to pro-
vide logging and auditing facility that compliments the security of Cloud applications
and identity management system both. Generally, Cloud SPs are more concerned about
the maintenance of logs such as recording of all sensitive user activities (authentication
requests forwarded to an IDMS). Logs help in identifying the person responsible for
any security breach, thus, accordingly the legally responsible person is penalized for his
actions. Whereas, auditing is of mutual interest to the CSCs and CSPs, auditing at one
end help CSPs in making sure that their systems/services are in line with their business
objectives. On the other hand, auditing highlights the security loopholes that the ser-
vice consumer needs to know and upon which he either makes his decision of electing
the IDMS. Logging and auditing can be achieved via any of the mechanisms mentioned
below:
Activity Monitoring: Identity management systems may offer auditing and logging via
user activity monitoring functionality (Ates et al. 2011). Often system administrators in
Cloud come across situations when they need to answer “Who did it?” though that hap-
pens fairly less, but those events are critical. In order to get ahead in security and to timely
identify systemmisuse and user misbehavior, monitoring should be a necessity. An IDMS
offers monitoring by tracking and storing each user action or web access in the log files
that are later used for auditing purposes.
History Maintenance: Identity management systems might incorporate history mainte-
nance module for maintaining the history of all user actions (such as web access) and
attribute exchanges among the service consumers, IdPs and CSPs (Angin et al. 2010;
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Ranchal et al. 2010). History maintenance module benefits the CSPs by preserving the
user activity logs thus in case of any security breach the wrongdoer can be identified
appropriately. Whereas, Cloud service consumers are benefited by the storage of attribute
sharing history that helps them in making future attribute disclosure decisions whenever
they access the same service or resource again.
There is a strong association between the above-mentioned security features and the
attacks presented in Section ‘Cloud identity management: known attack matrix’. Each of
these mechanisms is capable of mitigating one or more attacks that could be launched
against a Cloud IDMS. In order to provide better understanding, we have summarized
our findings in Table 2, which depicts a clear mapping between the identified features,
mechanisms and the attacks they can mitigate. For instance, if a Cloud IDMS offers
Authentication using Biometrics, then it is capable of mitigating attacks such as brute-
force (A1), dictionary attack (A6), forgery (A10), impersonation/identity spoofing (A13)
and repudiation (A17), since biometrics involve natural characteristics (such as finger-
print, voice patterns etc.) that are unique for every individual and hard to counterfeit.
Similarly, if a Cloud IDMS follows Identity Federation principle through Hierarchical
Storage, then it will limit Unauthorized disclosure of confidential data (A7), Elevation of
privileges (A9), Forgery (A10), Identity theft (A12) and Impersonation attack (A13), as the
information will be stored in fragments across multiple servers. Therefore, although the
attacker somehow manages to compromise one Cloud identity management server and
accesses its stored information even then they are unable to launch any attack because
all they can acquire is partial information that is simply insufficient to perform the
attack.
Table 2 Relationship b/w Features, Mechanisms and AttackMatrix
Features Mechanism Mitigated attacks
Something You Know (OTP & CR) A2, A5, A6, A7, A10, A11, A12
Authentication Something You Have (Tokens) A5, A14
Something You Are (Biometrics) A1, A4, A5, A12
Access Control Policies A3, A6, A13
Authorization OAuth A5, A6, A7, A8, A10, A11
Access Right Delegation A3, A6
Smart-card (Encryption) A5, A12
Identity Multiple IdPs and CSPs A7, A8, A13, A14




Privacy Pseudonyms A8, A10
Encryption A5, A7, A8, A10, A14, A15
Limited Disclosure A6, A7, A8
User-centricity Consistet Experience A9, A10
Data Disclosures Policies A3, A6, A9, A13
Audit & Logging Activity Monitoring A1, A4, A12
History Maintenance A9, A12
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Results
Analysis of cloud identity management systems
Taxonomy, presented in Section ‘Methods’, is being used here as an assessment criterion
for the evaluation of existing IDMSs. The objective of our analysis is to assist CSCs and
CSPs in selecting the most appropriate IDMS that best suit their functional and secu-
rity requirements. We have critically analyzed various Cloud based identity management
systems; Table 3 provides a brief overview of the reviewed systems and their important
technical features. In addition to this, identity management systems from each category
(Deployment based, Featured based) have been analytically evaluated against the IDMS
features discussed above and findings from the analysis are presented at the end of this
section in Tables 4 and 5.
Deployment based classification
1. Isolated IDMS
– A Strong User Authentication Framework for Cloud Computing:
Choudhury et al. (2011) propose a strong user authentication framework that
conforms to the Isolated IDMS properties, where single Cloud SP is respon-
sible for the storage, maintenance and verification of identity credentials and
does not rely on any trusted third party (IdP). Proposed framework uses
smart card based on bilinear pairings and user password to provide two-level
Authentication, in order to avoids illegitimate access to Cloud resources
and data. The framework offers User-Centricity by offering support to self-
service feature via password change facility specified in the system design. The
proposed secure Cloud framework ensures user Privacy via limited disclosure
principle by using two separate channels for the transmission of sensitive user
credentials that minimizes the impact of information disclosure and ascertain
protection against identity theft attacks. Distribution of credentials is achieved
in a way that some information is stored in the user’s smart card, whereas
one-time key (password) is sent by the server to user’s mobile via SMS, thus
offering support to Identity federation as well. However, the system spec-
ifies no Authorization mechanism. Furthermore, the design of proposed
framework falls short, as far as Auditing and Logging is concerned.
– Protection of Identity Information in Cloud Computing without Trusted
third party: Ranchal et al. (2010) has described a security solution for
Personal Identity Information (PII) that prevents unauthorized disclosure
and usage of user’s sensitive identity information. Proposed scheme ensures
user Privacy via AB, which discloses restricted PII to the SP following the
limited disclosure principle, and provides security against identity attacks.
AB scheme offers User Centricity by incorporating ‘Disclosure Policy’ com-
ponent through which users can specify policies for their data. Disclosure
policy component ultimately ensures the security of their sensitive informa-
tion accumulated at the Cloud SPs and offers a Consistent user experience
across multiple SPs. Another significant feature of AB scheme is ‘Identity
Data’, which stores encrypted identity information that is later used for secure
user Authentication. ‘Disclosure History’ is yet another important feature
of AB scheme which offers history maintenance, and is later used to carry
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Table 3 Key Features of Cloud IDMSs
Type Cloud IDMSs Salient features
Deployment Based Cloud IDMS
A Strong User Authentication
Framework for Cloud Computing
(Choudhury et al. 2011)
- Conforms to isolated IDMS properties
- Offers security and privacy of user by restricting
illegal access
- Mutual authentication (Challenge Response
& OTP scheme)
- Secure session key generation and distribution
- Multi-factor authentication (Password and
smart-card).
Isolated IDMS Protection of Identity Information in
Cloud Computing without Trusted
third party (Ranchal et al. 2010)
- Isolated IDMS, since it does not rely on any
trusted third-party
- Protects PII against unauthorized disclosure
- Computes assertions over encrypted data
- Active bundle scheme for un-trusted hosts
- Encrypted storage of identity data
An Identity-Centric Internet:
Identity in the Cloud, IDaaS and
other delights (Ates et al. 2011)
- Realization of centralized Cloud IDMS
- Defines the concept of Identity in Cloud Agents
(IC-Agents)
- IC-Agents as an identity proxy perform identity
propagation transactions
- Explains the IDaaS module in the context of
Personal Data-as-a-Service
- Authentication and Authorization as-a-Service
module
Centralized IDMS Distributed Identity for Secure
Service Interaction (Chowdhury and
Noll 2007)
- Presents a role based IDMS architecture
- Categorizes digital identity as Personal,
Corporate and Social identity
- Restricted disclosure of identity credentials to
the CSPs
- Centralized IdP is responsible for the sharing
and distribution of user’s identity credentials
Security and Cloud Computing:
ICIMI (Celesti et al. 2010)
- Inter-Cloud Identity Management
Infrastructure (ICIMI) is a federated IDMS
- Allows for the expansion of virtualization
infrastructure
- Establishment of trust among CSPs
- Offers standardized, scalable & dynamic
authentication
Strengthen Cloud Computing
Security with FIM Using HIBC (Yan
et al. 2009)
- Allocates unique identities in hierarchal fashion
- Mutual authentication for Hybrid Cloud
environment - Handles the establishment of
secret session keys
Federated IDMS Chord Based Identity Management
for e-Healthcare Cloud Applications
(Kim et al. 2010)
- SSO service for Cloud based e-Healthcare
application - Uses Peer-to-Peer service model
for load balancing
- Distributes session information in the
federated Cloud environment
- Limits the number of authentication requests
to central IdP
Security APIs for My Private Cloud
(Chadwick and Casenove 2011)
- Federated access rights to Cloud resources
- Proposes Authz API for maintaining the identity
database and defining the access control mappings
- Authn API for authenticating the Cloud users
- Delegation API to delegate access rights to
anyone at any time
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Table 3 Key Features of Cloud IDMSs (Continued)




- Identity based One-time Password (OTP)
authentication scheme
- Operates on smart card based bilinear pairings
- Generates a temporary identity to protect
user’s actual identity
- Describes Process Setup and User Registration
module
- Guarantees user’s anonymity and privacy
throughout the communication process
Anonymous IDMS UIMM Based on Anonymous
Credentials (Zhang and Chen 2010)
- Universal Identity Management Model (UIMM)
that operates on anonymous credentials
- Allows for access right delegation
- Ensures user’s privacy preservation via
unlikable self-generated pseudonyms
- Extend WS-Federation to implement Identity
Meta-system model.
An Entity-centric Approach for
Privacy and Identity Management
in Cloud Computing (Angin et al.
2010)
- Entity-centric architecture for Identity
Management in
- Implements Active Bundles (AB) scheme to
ensures user’s anonymity
- AB encapsulates Personal Identity Information
(PII), Privacy preserving rules and VM (Virtual
Machine)
- Implements anonymous identification
(Enhancing Privacy and Dynamic
Federation in IdM for Consumer
Cloud Computing (Sanchez et al.
2012)
- Dynamic privacy-enhanced federated identity
management solution that defines an enhanced
privacy
- Introduces a new reputation protocol and
implements Enhanced Client Profile (ECP)
- Presents Trust aware IDM architecture that
mainly comprises of Identity Management (IdM)
layer and Trust layer
- IdM Layer facilitates user authentication,
authorizations and profile management
- Trust layer deals with the management,
negotiation and distribution of trust related
data to other layers.
User-Centric IDMS User-Controlled Automated
Identity Delegation (Hoellrigl et al.
2010)
- Implements Identity Delegate that applies user
defined data disclosure policies and resolves the
information consistency problem
- Allows for the integration of multiple IdPs and SPs
- Dissemination of identity credentials is kept
under the control of the identity owner
out auditing, thus offering support to Auditing and Logging principle. This
scheme eliminates the need of a TTP for the handling of identity management
functions as it follows the distributed storage and computation mechanism by
distributing the secret identity information among multiple nodes to ensure
security as well as Identity Federation. However, Authorization is not
included in the proposed solution for the assurance of appropriate access























Table 4 Analysis of Deployment based IDMSs
Categories Cloud IDMSs Authn Authz Identity Federation Privacy User-Centricity Audit & Logging
A Strong User Authentication
Framework for Cloud Computing
(Choudhury et al. 2011)
Smart card +
OTP
– Mobile phone + Smart Card Limited Disclosure Self-Service –
Isolated
IDMS
Protection of Identity Info. in CC
without TTP (Ranchal et 2010)
– – Distributed Computation Limited Disclosure Consistent Experience History Maintenance
An Identity-Centric Internet:
Identity in the Cloud, IDaaS (Ates
et al. 2011)
SSO Access Control Policy Distributed Computation User Roles Self-Service Activity Monitoring
Centralized
IDMS
Distributed Identity for Secure




Access Control Policy Distributed Computation Limited Disclosure Consistent Experience –
Security and Cloud Computing:
ICIMI (Celesti et al. 2010)
SSO – Multiple IdPs Limited Disclosure Consistent Experience –
Strengthen Cloud Computing
Security with FIM Using HIBC (Yan
et al. 2009)
SSO – Hierarchical Storage Limited Disclosure Consistent Experience –
Federated
IDMS
Chord Based Identity Management
for e-Healthcare Cloud Applications
(Kim et al. 2010)
SSO – Distributed Computation Encryption Consistent Experience –
Security APIs for My Private Cloud:
granting access to anyone
(Chadwick and Casenove 2011)























Table 5 Analysis of Deployment based IDMSs
Categories Cloud IDMSs Authn Authz Identity Federation Privacy User-Centricity Audit & Logging
An Identity-Based OTP Scheme
with Anonymous Authentication
(Luo et al. 2009)
Smart card + OTP – Smart Card Pseudonyms Self-Service –
Anonymous
IDMS
UIMM Based on Anonymous




– Pseudonyms + Data
Disclosure Prefer.
– –
An Entity-centric Approach for
Privacy & IDM in Coud Computing
(Angin et al. 2010)
– – – Limited Disclosure – History Maintenance
User-Centric
IDMS
Enhancing Privacy and Dynamic
Federation in IdM for Consumer
Cloud Computing (Hoellrigl et al.
2010)
PKI OAUTH – – – –
User-Controlled Automated
Identity Delegation (Sanchez et al.
2012)
User name + Pwd OAUTH + Access
Control Policy
Multiple IdPs Data Disclosure Prefer. – –
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2. Centralized IDMS
– An Identity-Centric Internet: Identity in the Cloud, IDaaS and other
delights: Concept of Identity in Cloud Agents (IC-Agents) is presented in
Ates et al. (2011), which is a logical identity proxy with Identity as a Ser-
vice (IDaaS) component. The proposed concept of logical identity proxy
(IC-Agent) ensures the segregation of user’s PII while disseminating user’s
credentials across multiple SPs. Moreover, IC-Agents acquire user consent
before disclosing their sensitive identity information mandatory for the verifi-
cation process thus offering support to Privacy feature. Moreover, IC-Agents
are capable of monitoring and logging all the operations of user (for instance
authorizations and other service accesses), which may help to carry out the
auditing processes as per SP’s requirement, thus offering support to Audit-
ing and Logging principle. Furthermore, IC-Agents provide interfaces called
dashboards for user Authentication and are capable of functioning as a per-
sonal IdP to provide SSO facility that eliminates the need of repeated user
logins for each independent resource access. IC-Agents is a User-Centric
identity management concept where users are provided with full control
over their identity information stored at IC-Agent host (Software and Hard-
ware) by offering support to self-service mechanism. Proposed concept of
IC-Agent is based on the distributed storage architecture for personal data
storage where some data is stored by the IC-Agent, while other information
is retrieved from multiple distinct IC-Agent sources thus follows the Identity
Federation principle. IC-Agent applies the user defined data disclosure poli-
cies while forwarding user credentials to the SPs for secure authentication and
Authorization.
– Distributed Identity for Secure Service Interaction: Chowdhury and Noll
(2007) present a Role based identity management architecture that utilizes
users’ mobile devices as unique attributes of their digital identity. Presented
architecture ensures user’s Privacy by following the limited disclosure prin-
ciple, where each identifier discloses limited information to the SP while
accessing multiple related services. System complements user privacy even
more by accepting the segregation and distinction among the different iden-
tity contexts such as personal, social and corporate identity. Authorization
is provided through role based access control model that implements access
control policies considering user roles. The Identity Federationmechanism
is ensured via distributed storage and computation mechanism, which dis-
tributes the identifying information across multiple locations, for instance
partial user credentials are held in the network storage area, whereas the
other half is stored at the user’s mobile device (SIM card). Proposed system
offers User Centricity since it offers self-service feature via my digital iden-
tity component that allows the user to alter, append or revoke his stored
identity credentials. Moreover, network based identity data store (My digital
identity) enables the user to define data disclosure policies that guarantees
seamless and consistent user experience across multiple SPs. System pro-
vides Authentication via user’s SIM card so belongs to the “something you
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have” authentication mechanism; the system also proposes an extended SIM
card architecture that holds multiple credentials for different authentication
services. However, the system does not specify any Auditing and Logging
functionality that is critical for maintaining and keeping the check and balance
on CSCs as well as Cloud SPs for the security of IDMSs.
3. Federated IDMS
– Security and Cloud Computing-ICIMI: Inter-Cloud Identity Management
Infrastructure (ICIMI) is described in Celesti et al. (2010), which is a fed-
erated IDMS. ICIMI uses IdP/SP model to provide Authentication, where
Home Cloud performs one-time authentication to access the federated For-
eign Cloud services that are in its shared trusted domain thus follows the SSO
mechanism. This infrastructure offers support to User-Centricity by provid-
ing a solution that offers consistent user experience since it is independent of
the underlying authentication mechanisms and incorporates standards such
as SAML, which is capable of accepting assertions having different formats.
Moreover, ICIMI is based on distributed system architecture comprising of
multiple IdPs; therefore, the mechanism for storage and retrieval of user cre-
dentials follows the Identity Federation principle. In addition, this scheme
offers Privacy via limited disclosure principle where Home Cloud hides the
identity of CSCs by making the resource acquirement request on behalf of its
consumers (users). However, the system incorporates no Authorization or
access control mechanism that ensures legitimate access to Cloud services and
resources. Secure logging to ensure Auditing and Logging is another signif-
icant feature of IDMSs but is not reflected in the design and architecture of
the proposed infrastructure.
– Strengthen Cloud Computing Security with FIM Using HIBC: A Feder-
ated Identity Management (FIM) system for Cloud along with Hierarchical
Identity-Based-Cryptography (HIBC) is described in Yan et al. (2009), which
allocates unique identities to users and servers in hierarchical fashion. This
system provides Authentication via SSO mechanism that requires the user
to use single identity credentials for accessing multiple services and resources
that are provided by distinct SPs. HIBC offers support to Identity Federation
principle by specifying the hierarchical storage approach for identity storage
andmaintenance. In addition, HIBCmodel ensuresUser Centricity by incor-
porating numerous authentication protocols supported by distinct Cloud SPs
and offers a consistent user experience to the service consumers. The HIBC
model ensures Privacy through limited disclosure principle where same
exclusive identity information is disclosed in each resource access request.
However, no access control policies are specified in themodel for ensuring the
legitimate access by authoritative users hence lacksAuthorization capability.
Similarly, proposed HIBC model lacks Auditing and Logging capability.
– ChordBased IdentityManagement for e-Healthcare CloudApplications:
Kim et al. (2010) presents an algorithm, Chord for Cloud (C4C) so that
the customers of one Cloud may use the services of the other Cloud
environments, with single user identity. Proposed C4C algorithm offers the
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Authentication via SSO principle where session values are extracted from
the user’s service request and are verified by the SP (node). After success-
ful verification, user is given access to the requested service thus offering
user with seamless service provisioning. This algorithm offers support to
User Centricity by incorporating protocols such as SAML and OpenID
that ensures consistent user experience. Moreover, C4C follows the Iden-
tity Federation principle by offering the distributed storage and computation
architecture. User credentials are disseminated among multiple Cloud nodes
for authentication purposes, whereas sensitive identity information at each
processing node is secured via Intrusion Detection Systems. In addition,
C4C is composed of multiple components out of which Session Manager
(SM) module is responsible for maintaining the information about valid user
sessions and after successful verification, this SMmodule initiates theAutho-
rization process. SM module creates session for each authenticated user and
specifies valid time slot for each created session. To ensure Privacy, user cre-
dentials are kept encrypted throughout the valid user sessions and revoked
after the session is terminated thus following limited disclosure principle. The
algorithm does not does not support Auditing and Logging feature.
– Security APIs for My Private Cloud: A conceptual model along with the
security architecture is presented in Chadwick and Casenove (2011) that
describes a set of three security APIs each designed for a specific functionality.
Authentication API deals with the verification and identification of users and
sends back user’s identity credentials to the Cloud. Authentication is pro-
vided via SSO, where user logouts are restricted to the Cloud applications only
and session with the authentication IdP/server remains active. Authoriza-
tion API on the basis of user’s identity attributes and access control policies
decides what rights a particular Cloud user may possess and when to revoke
those access rights. These security APIs enable the Cloud users to protect their
Privacy in Cloud by following limited disclosure principle where users can
specify their own privacy policies for the protection of their information from
other users. This model enables the Cloud resource owners to monitor and
log the activities of their potential users, in order to ensure that only the legit-
imate resource can be accessed by the user having valid delegated attributes
thus offers support to Auditing and Logging principle. In order to provide
support to User-Centricity, proposed model offers support to multiple IdP
protocols such as SAML and OpenID and offers consistent user experience.
Moreover, this model enables the user to relate his identity information across
multiple SPs to raise his assurance level for authentication purposes thus
offering support to Identity Federation feature as well.
Functional behavior class
1. Anonymous IDMS
– An Identity-Based OTP Scheme with Anonymous Authentication: Iden-
tity based One-time Password (OTP) authentication scheme is presented in
Luo et al. (2009) that operates on smart card based bilinear pairings. Proposed
OTP scheme uses temporary identity information called pseudonyms to
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ensure anonymity and Privacy by service consumers. Scheme utilizes smart
card that is based on bilinear pairings and generates OTP along with the tem-
porary user identity to ensure anonymity and security in the Authentication
process. Identity Federation feature is ensured through the combination
of smart card and OTP where identity information is collected from multi-
ple sources to generate user credentials that are finally used in the process
of authentication or Authorization. OTP scheme offers support to User-
Centricity by incorporating self-service feature through password change
facility module thus enabling the user to change or update his password with-
out any assistance from the server side. However, the proposed OTP scheme
offers no Auditing and Logging that maintains the logs of all user activities.
– UIMMBased on Anonymous Credentials Zhang and Chen (2010) proposes
a Universal Identity Management Model (UIMM) where users are allowed to
prove the ownership of their identity credentials without having to communi-
cate with the IdP. In the proposed model, Privacy is ensured via pseudonym
based signature scheme that ensures the minimal and selective disclosure of
user information. The Authentication module includes IdP that provides
the identity credentials to users and is also responsible for performing their
verification. UIMM also ensures Authorized access to multiple federated
security realms. The identity meta-system component aims to provide User-
Centricity via identity selector component that allows the user to choose the
credentials for different resource accesses. On the contrary, UIMM offers no
support for Identity Federation; even though it allows the user to access the
information from anywhere, but that information is retrieved from a central
location, which may result in single point of failure. This model does not offer
support to Auditing and Logging principle.
– An Entity-centric Approach for Privacy and Identity Management in
Cloud Computing Angin et al. (2010) present an entity-centric architecture
for Identity Management in Cloud that uses Active Bundles (AB) scheme and
ensures user’s anonymity by applying privacy preserving policies. Presented
scheme offers Privacy via limited disclosure principle, which implements
information disclosure policy provided by AB scheme. Identity data module
of the AB scheme comprises of the encrypted authentication information that
the SP requires while performing user Authentication. AB scheme incorpo-
rates a Disclosure history module that offers support to future information
disclosure decisions considering past user interactions and ensure Logging
and Auditing feature. However, proposed entity-centric architecture lacks
support for User-Centricity since, no support for Consistent user experi-
ence is provided by the architecture. All the identity information is stored
in the AB; a centralized location, Identity Federation principle is not fol-
lowed. Authorization module that can ensure legitimate resource access is
not incorporated in this architecture.
2. User-Centric IDMS
– Enhancing Privacy and Dynamic Federation in IdM for Consumer Cloud
Computing: Sánchez et al. (2012) presents a dynamic privacy-enhanced
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federated identity management solution for on-demand resources provi-
sioning in cloud computing scenarios. Proposed system provides Privacy
management along with the complete control of users over their data through
ECP and privacy engine modules. The system also offers User Centricity via
user profile management module that allows the user to perform self-service.
System incorporates Authenticationmodule that supports various authenti-
cation mechanisms such as user name/password and digital certificates. User
resource and service accesses are monitored via activity monitoring module,
thus facilitating theAuditing and Logging feature. TheAuthorizationmod-
ule uses OAUTH protocol for the exchange of user’s identity attributes in the
process of authorization. Proposed system offers support to dynamic Cloud
federation where Cloud trusts are established; however, it does not offer sup-
port to distributed storage mechanisms, hence, does not provide Identity
federation features.
– User-Controlled Automated Identity Delegation: Hoellrigl et al. (2010)
has described a user-controlled automated identity delegation solution that
attempts to address the information consistency problem in a user-centric
identity management system. Proposed system implements a User Access
Management (UAM) module that enhances OAUTH protocol and offer
support to Authorization via user defined access control policies and prefer-
ences. The system allows the user to federate his identity information across
multiple IdPs thus offering support to Identity Federation feature. It offers
Authentication by simple user name and password mechanism. It supports
User Centricity by automating the process of disseminating the identity
attributes in accordance with the user’s data disclosure preferences. System
fails to provide Privacy, since user information can be linked across various
malicious SPs that may interact to correlate user identities. Similarly, this sys-
tem does not monitor and log the user activities thus lack support to Logging
and Auditing feature.
Discussion
Research findings & future research directions
We have performed an in-depth analysis of various Cloud based IDMSs in Section
‘Results’, which reveals that most of the systems do not offer support to all the essen-
tial features of Cloud IDMS and the ones that do, have their own weaknesses. None of
the discussed techniques heuristically covers all the security features; moreover, they lack
compliance to international standards which, understandably, undermines their credibil-
ity. Besides, identified features are worth considering, but are not mandatory as security
and business requirements vary from one organization to the other. Organizations mov-
ing towards Cloud would benefit from this work by evaluating the security of the IDMSs
in advance to avoid any adversity.
Furthermore, we have identified the current gaps, challenges and future key-trends
related to Cloud identity management systems that must be considered by the Cloud
identity service providers and subscribers. According to the most recent analysis, Identity
with access management has been included among the top ten mega-trends for year 2014
by many well-known vendors and consultancy organizations including CA Technologies,
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Gartner, Ping Identity and Oracle. Although the applications for managing identities vary
from region to region, and even from business to business, they generally fall into one of
the following areas.
1. Service automation: (Rose et al. 2011) By combining the individual’s personal
information into business processes organization shall be able to achieve efficient,
automated and simplified transactions rather than the manual user input in activities
such as user identification, authentication and authorization.
2. Increased user control: (Rose et al. 2011) Electronic identity enables the individuals
to perform transactions on their own, without any assistance from the administra-
tors or IT professionals. Self-service is a key example of user enablement. This aspect
has recently achieved much attention from the IT industry and seems to continue its
growth in new businesses as well.
3. Naming and identification of resources: Cloud providers offers wide range
of services and resources including servers, storage and network to its sub-
scribers. Therefore, to avoid any conflict and confusion, inter-Cloud IDMS must
specify a mechanism for the naming and identification of Cloud services and
resources.
4. Interoperability of Identity information: While performing user authentication
and authorization, identity credentials could be expressed in a variety of ways for
instance X.509 certificates, SAML assertions or WS-Federation security tokens. In
inter-Cloud scenario, such representations result in syntactic and semantic issues
hence requires interoperable identity information.
5. Identity life cycle Management: Throughout the life time of an entity, modifica-
tions in its attribute values, access permissions and service provisioning may occur.
Consequently, all identity management systems are required to have updated and syn-
chronized identity information to avoid any conflicts caused by the usage of old user
data.
6. Single sign-on for interactions on the Inter-Cloud: Single sign-on must be imple-
mented in a way that if users get successfully authenticated at one Cloud service
provider, then throughput their valid session they must not be prompted again for
authentication on any other (member) Cloud service provider.
7. Hardware components in cellular devices will become an increasingly impor-
tant part of Identity management systems: (CA Technologies Predicts Key Trends
for Identity and Access Management in 2014 (2014)) Due to the increase in the adop-
tion of newmobile devices, advanced hardware protection technologies, such as ARM
TrustZone, will become widely available. In addition to securing the hardware, users
will be able to use their cell phones for authentication and identity proofing purposes
while performing sensitive functions like financial transactions.
8. Lack of scalable identity proofing will continue to vex broader B2C/G2C deploy-
ments: As more and more users register for online services, validation of digital
identities in an accurate and scalable manner is becoming a constant challenge (CA
Technologies Predicts Key Trends for Identity and Access Management in 2014
(2014)). In addition to this, with the increase in identity proofing sources (such as
new public and private records hosted by business or government organizations),
the demand for scalable identity proofing will be further strengthened in 2014.
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Consequently, it will require the IT industry to work in partnership and deliver
scalable identity proofing mechanisms.
9. Risk-based authentication expands beyond Financial Services: The require-
ment for both strong authentication and consistent user experience will result in
the widespread adoption of risk-based authentication systems. In such systems, the
contextual information about service consumers, hardware devices and software
applications is analyzed to determine the risk level for consumer’s identity (CA Tech-
nologies Predicts Key Trends for Identity and Access Management in 2014 (2014)).
Initially these services were adopted by the financial services only, however with the
increase in requirement for improved security with improved user convenience; this
technology will begin to be more widely adopted across other industries as well.
Above, we have provided a comprehensive list of state-of-the-art challenges and gaps
that are needed to be addressed by the Cloud IDMS research community, and without
which the very phenomenon of Cloud identity management is not fully achieved.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented research that is a step towards the development of an
assessment criterion that can be used by other researchers and industry professionals to
perform the evaluation of existing, as well as future Cloud based IDMSs. Since the domain
of Cloud IDMS is still in its early stages, therefore, requires considerable attention from
the research community and IT industry. We have contributed in this regard, by present-
ing a research work that holistically covers the domain of Cloud IDMSs. In particular, our
contribution is multi-dimensional: first, we have presented a comprehensive list of secu-
rity attacks that involve Cloud identity management systems and identity credentials as
an attack tool or target, secondly we have identified the features that will act as coun-
termeasure against the mentioned attacks. Thirdly, state-of-the-art mechanisms against
each feature are filtered out with an objective to maximize their performance, security
and interoperability. As another positive contribution, we have explicated the feature-
mechanism relationship in the form of a well-organized taxonomy which is later used to
analyze/evaluate various Cloud based IDMSs. Lastly, we have applied the previously dis-
cussed attacks against each Cloud IDMS to confirm their reliability and applicability in
Cloud. Our findings from the analysis are presented in the subsequent tables which prove
that Cloud IDMSs invariably have some pros and cons in their architecture and function-
ality. Furthermore, most of these Cloud IDMSs have limitations in terms of their reliability
and applicability, as they are confined only to specific Cloud identity management scenar-
ios. In conclusion, our work will augment the research which leads to the development
and designing of a robust and holistically secure Cloud based IDMS covering all the iden-
tified features. Presented taxonomy will allow CSCs and CSPs to make a knowledgeable
decision by selecting an appropriate IDMS that best satisfies their security and functional
requirements.
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